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Abstract
We show that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and
proﬁts are taxed at one hundred percent, then unit (speciﬁc) taxation and ad valorem
taxation are welfare-wise equivalent. This is contrary to all known claims. Journal of
Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number:H21
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1. Introduction
It is well-known that, in a competitive environment, unit (or speciﬁc) taxation and ad
valorem taxation are equivalent. Cournot [1838, 1960] realized that the two tax systems
needed diﬀerent treatment in the case of monopoly. Wicksell [1896, 1959] argued that
ad valorem taxes dominate unit taxation in a monopoly; a complete demonstration of
this dominance was given by Suits and Musgrave [1955]. More speciﬁcally they demon-
strated, if the consumer price and quantity of the monopoly good remained unchanged,
that the government tax yield is higher with ad valorem taxes than under a regime of
unit taxes. This follows because the proﬁt-maximizing price of the monopolist is lower
under ad valorem taxation than under unit taxation. Most recent work in this area has
investigated forms of competition between pure monopoly and competition implicitly or
explicitly accepting the above dominance argument. Delipalla and Keen [1992] examine
diﬀerent models of oligopoly with and without free entry to compare the two types of tax
regimes while Lockwood [2004] shows, in a tax competition model, that tax competition
is more intense with ad valorem taxes thus yielding a lower price in equilibrium.
Wicksell and Suits and Musgrave derived the above mentioned monopoly result in
a partial equilibrium framework and claimed that ad valorem taxation was superior to
unit taxation on welfare grounds. Recently, stronger and more explicit claims have been
made: Skeath and Trandel [1994; p. 55] state that “in the monopoly case, given any unit
excise tax, it is possible to ﬁnd an ad valorem tax that Pareto dominates it.”; Keen [1996;
p. 9] states that “The conclusion—due to Skeath and Trandel [1994]—is thus strikingly
unambiguous: with monopoly provision of a single good of ﬁxed quality, consumers prefer
ad valorem taxation because it leads to a lower price, ﬁrms prefer it because it leads
to higher proﬁts and government prefers it because it leads to higher revenue. There is
no need to trade oﬀ the interests of these three groups: ad valorem taxation dominates
speciﬁc.”
It is this claimed welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxation that
we challenge in this paper. In the context of a general equilibrium model with a single
monopoly sector, we prove that unit and ad valorem taxation are equivalent.
More speciﬁcally, we take a standard general equilibrium model in which a single
monopoly sector has been imbedded.1 In particular we adapt the model of Guesnerie
and Laﬀont [1978] (hereafter GL) to pose this question. In order to study alternative tax
schemes it must be the case that indirect taxation is an optimal instrument; we permit
the government to employ a demogrant, a transfer (positive or negative) that is common
1 Our results hold for any symmetric Cournot oligopoly as well.
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to all consumers rather than individual lump-sum transfers. In addition, we need to
decide how to treat the proﬁts of the competitive and monopoly sector. The government
can either levy one hundred percent proﬁt taxation or the proﬁts can be rebated to the
individual consumers in proportion to the shares held in the companies. It is common
in public economics to adopt the former assumption as it is usually an innocuous but
simplifying assumption;2 we follow this tradition here because it seems closest to the
analysis of the partial equilibrium models whose results we challenge. In order for partial
equilibrium models to be consistent with utility maximization, quasi-linear preferences are
required and this means that the relevant demands are independent of the distribution of
income.3 Assuming one hundred percent taxation of proﬁts is the closest that one can
come to avoiding income eﬀects in a general equilibrium framework. Nevertheless, this
assumption does have strong implications and in our concluding remarks we discuss some
of the additional problems that arise if monopoly proﬁts are privately distributed. It should
be noted however that if private ownership of the ﬁrms makes a substantial diﬀerence, it
is because of income eﬀects and the partial equilibrium models cannot cannot handle such
changes in any case.
We ﬁrst characterize the set of Pareto optima in the economy with unit taxation.
We then convert each Pareto-optimal unit-tax equilibrium into an equivalent ad valorem
tax equilibrium and ask if there exist any feasible ad valorem tax Pareto improvements
from this equilibrium. We show that there none. We then reverse this procedure and
characterize the set of Pareto optima with ad valorem taxes, convert these equilibria to
unit tax equilibria, and then show that there are no possible Pareto improvements using
unit taxes. Thus, we prove that ad valorem and unit taxation are equivalent. The set of
Pareto optima under unit taxes is identical to the set of Pareto optima under ad valorem
taxation.
The reasons that our results are in striking contrast to the literature are two-fold.
The partial equilibrium problem analyzed by Wicksell and Suits-Musgrave ignores that,
although tax revenues go up in the switch to ad valorem taxes, the proﬁts of the monop-
olist go down. In a general equilibrium framework this reduction in proﬁt must show up
somewhere else. With one hundred percent taxation this simply means that government
revenue from proﬁt taxation goes down by the same amount that its revenue from indi-
rect taxes went up. The surplus analysis of Skeath and Trandel arrives at an incorrect
conclusion because the criteria they use do not translate into improvements in the sense
of Pareto.4
2 A common alternative assumption is constant return-to-scale which simply eliminates proﬁts; this
will not work here because of the monopoly sector.
3 See Chipman and Moore [1976] and Silverberg [1972].
4 This is not surprising given these surplus arguments have already been shown to perform rather
badly in both competitive and non competitive environments; see Blackorby and Donaldson [1985,1999].
However, even in the quasi-linear case, when most surplus arguments do work, the aggregate surplus is
independent of the distribution of wealth. In this problem it is the distribution of wealth that is of crucial
importance and ignoring it can lead to errors.
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In the next section we introduce the notation, in the following we characterize the set
of unit tax Pareto optima after which we convert the Pareto-optimal unit-tax equilibria
into ad valorem equilibrium. In the following section we show that all such ad valorem
equilibrium are also Pareto optimal. We reverse this procedure and show that ad valorem
and unit taxation are equivalent.
2. Notation
The preferences of each of the H consumers are represented by an indirect utility function,
uh = V
h(q0, q,m) for h = 1, . . . , H (2.1)
where q0 ∈ R++ is the consumer price of the monopoly good, q ∈ RN++ is the vector
of consumer prices of the competitively supplied goods. The demogrant—a transfer that
is common to all consumers—is given by m.5 V h is assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and strongly quasi-convex.6 The demands are given by Roy’s Theorem and
the aggregate demand for the monopoly good is
x0 =
∑
h
∗xh0 = ∗x0(q0, q,m) (2.2)
and the aggregate demand vector for the competitively supplied commodities is given by
x =
∑
h
xh(q0, q,m) (2.3)
The consumer prices and producer prices are related by unit taxes, that is, q0 = p0+t0 and
q = p + t, where p0 and p are the producer prices of the monopoly good and competitive
goods respectively. The unit tax on the monopoly good and the competitive goods are t0
and t respectively.
As discussed in detail in GL the proﬁt function of the monopolist (the function over
which he optimizes) is not in general concave. Following them we assume that the solu-
tion to monopolist’s proﬁt maximization problem is locally unique and smooth. For the
monopoly let
〈P u0 (p, t0, t,m), Y u0 (p, t0, t,m)〉 :=
argmaxpu0 ,y
u
0
{p0yu0 − C(yu0 , p)|yu0 ≥ ∗x0(q0, q,m)},
(2.4)
where the cost function of the monopolist is assumed to be diﬀerentially strongly concave.7
We assume that P u0 is single-valued and smooth and as in GL that
∇t0P u0 = −1; (2.5)
5 There is also a public good g but, as it remains constant throughout the analysis, it is suppressed in
the utility function.
6 See Diewert, Avriel and Zang [1981].
7 See Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang [1988].
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that is, the monopolist cannot undo all changes by the tax authority of t0. The input
demands by the monopolist from the competitive sector is given by
ym = ∇pC(yu0 , p). (2.6)
Monopoly proﬁt with unit taxation is given by
Πmu(pu0 , p, y
u
0 ) = p
u
0y
u
0 − pT∇pC(yu0 , p) = pu0yu0 − C(yu0 , p). (2.7)
The proﬁt function of the competitive sector Πc is assumed to be strongly convex and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable.8 Applying Hotelling’s Lemma it can be re-written as
Πc(p) = pT yc(p). (2.8)
In addition we assume that
rank [∇pyc(p)−∇pym(p) ] = N − 1. (2.9)
This ensures that the zero eigenvector is unique up to a positive scalar multiple.9 In
addition the government produces a public good g from inputs yg purchased from the
competitive sector by
g ≤ F (yg); (2.10)
we assume that F is increasing and diﬀerentially strongly concave.
Equilibrium in this unit-tax economy is given by
−x + yc − ym − yg ≥ 0, (2.11)
−∗x0(q0, q,m) + yu0 ≥ 0, (2.12)
pu0 − P u0 (p, t0, t,m) = 0, (2.13)
and
F (yg)− g ≥ 0. (2.14)
(2.11) is market clearing for the competitively produced commodities, (2.12) is market
clearing for the monopoly good, and (2.13) ensures that the monopolist is proﬁt maximizing
whereas (2.14) requires the public-good producing ﬁrm to buy enough inputs to produce
the ﬁxed amount of the public good.
Given that the indirect utility functions are increasing in income, the budget con-
straints of all the consumers are binding at their optimal bundles. In addition, if the
equilibrium conditions hold as equalities then from Walras Law it follows that the de-
mogrant is
m =
1
H
[
Πmu(pu0 , p, y
u
0 ) + t
Tx + t0y0 + Π
c(p)− pT yg
]
. (2.15)
8 See Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang [1988]. The assumption of a single competitive ﬁrm is
without loss of generality; see Bliss [1975].
9 In fact our regularity assumptions already guaranty this to be true almost everywhere.
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This is because aggregating over consumer budgets and using the equilibrium conditions,
(2.11) and (2.12), we obtain
Hm = q0
∗x0 + qTx
≤ (pu0 + t0)yu0 + (p + t)T [yc − ym − yg]
= pu0y
u
0 − pT ym + pT yc + tT [yc − ym − yg]− pT yg
= Πmu(pu0 , p, y
u
0 ) + t
T [yc − ym − yg] + t0y0 + Πc(p)− pT yg.
(2.16)
Thus, at an equilibrium where (2.11) and (2.12) hold as equalities, the government budget
just balances, i.e., the revenue of the government from indirect and proﬁt taxation, net of
its expenditure on the public good, gets distributed as the demogrant to the consumers.
3. Unit-Tax Pareto Optima
In order to characterize the set of Pareto optima with unit taxation, we assume ﬁrst
that the equilibrium conditions, (2.11)-(2.14) hold with equality. From this equilibrium
we calculate the directions of change in prices, taxes, and demogrant that could generate
strict Pareto improvements,10 preserve equilibrium, and ensure that the monopolist is
maximizing proﬁt and the public good producer can buy suﬃcient inputs to produce the
public good.11 If no such changes exist then the equilibrium with which we started is a
Pareto optimum.
Assume that the equilibrium conditions, (2.11)-(2.14), hold with equality. Then,
there exist strict Pareto-improving directions of change that are equilibrium-preserving
and provide for the production of the public good if and only if


−x10 −x10 −x1T −x1T 1 0TN 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
−xH0 −xH0 −xHT −xHT 1 0TN 0




dpu0
dt0
dp
dt
dm
dyg
dyu0


	 0 (3.1)
10 That is, changes that increase the utility of every consumer.
11 Walras Law ensures that, at the new equilibria reached by such directions of change, the government’s
budgets are always balanced in the sense of (2.16).
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and


−∇q0x −∇q0x −∇qx +∇pyc −∇pym −∇qx −∇mx −IN −∇yu0 ym
−∇q0x0 −∇q0x0 −∇Tq x0 −∇Tq x0 −∇mx0 0TN 1
0 0 0TN 0
T
N 0 ∇TygF 0




dpu0
dt0
dp
dt
dm
dyg
dyu0


≥ 0.
(3.2)
That the monopolist continues to maximize proﬁts after the changes is guaranteed by
[
1 −∇t0P u0 −∇Tp P0 −∇Tt P0 −∇mP u0 0TN 0
]


dpu0
dt0
dp
dt
dm
dyg
dyu0


= 0. (3.3)
If there exists a vector (dpu0 , dt0, dp, dt, dm, dy
g, dyu0 ) that satisﬁes (3.1)-(3.3), then
the equilibrium in question is not a Pareto optimum because there are feasible changes in
prices and quantities that make every individual better oﬀ. If there are no such feasible
changes, then the equilibrium is a Pareto optimum. In order to characterize the set of all
unit-tax Pareto optima, we employ Motzkin’s Theorem.12
We are at a Pareto optimum, that is, there is not solution to (3.1)-(3.3), if and only
if there exist 0 = s¯ ≥ 0, (v¯0, v¯T ) ≥ 0, r¯ ≥ 0 and β¯, such that
∑
h
s¯hx¯
h
0 = −v¯T∇q0 x¯− v¯0∇q0 x¯0 + β¯, (3.4)
∑
h
s¯hx¯
h
0 = −v¯T∇q0 x¯− v¯0∇q0 x¯0 − β¯∇t0P¯ u0 , (3.5)
∑
h
s¯hx¯
hT = −v¯T∇qx¯ + v¯T [∇py¯c −∇py¯m]− v¯0∇Tq x¯0 − β¯∇Tp P¯ u0 , (3.6)
∑
h
s¯hx¯
hT = −v¯T∇qx¯− v¯0∇Tq x¯0 − β¯∇Tt P¯ u0 , (3.7)
12 Motzkin’s Theorem states that either Ax 	 0, Bx ≥ 0, and Cx = 0 has a solution or sT A + vT B +
wT C = 0, where 0 = s ≥ 0 and v ≥ 0 has a solution but not both. See Mangasarian [1969] for a formal
statement and proof.
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∑
h
s¯h = v¯
T∇mx¯ + v¯0∇mx¯0 + β¯∇mP¯ u0 , (3.8)
v¯T = r¯∇Tyg F¯ , (3.9)
and
v¯T∇yu0 y¯m = v¯0. (3.10)
This system of equations, (3.4)-(3.10), characterizes all possible unit-tax Pareto op-
tima.13 However, the system can be simpliﬁed considerably as follows.
First, subtract (3.5) from (3.4), and then using (2.5) we obtain β¯ = 0.14 Next,
subtract (3.7) from (3.6) to obtain
v¯T [∇py¯c −∇py¯m] = 0. (3.11)
The rank condition, (2.9), guarantees that the zero eigenvector of [∇py¯c−∇py¯m] is unique
up to positive scalar multiplication. Thus (3.11) implies that
v¯T = µ¯p¯T . (3.12)
Then (3.9) implies in conjunction with (3.12), that
p¯T µ¯ = r¯∇Tyg F¯ , (3.13)
which implies that there is production eﬃciency in the production of competitive goods
in the economy. The competitive ﬁrms face prices p¯ and the monopolist buys inputs from
that sector at prices p¯. From (3.13) we see that
p¯i
p¯j
=
Fi(y¯
g)
Fj(y¯g)
for i, j = 1, . . . , N, (3.14)
so that the public sector ﬁrm is setting its marginal rates of transformation equal to the
ratios of producer prices of the competitive goods. Also, from (3.10) and (3.12), we have
µ¯∇yu0 C¯ = v¯0, (3.15)
that is, the marginal cost of the monopolist is proportional to the social shadow price v¯0
(the shadow price that would have prevailed under public production of the monopoly
good.) Thus, overall production eﬃciency is implied by (3.13) and (3.15).
13 Note that we employ some abbreviations: C¯ = C(y¯u0 , p¯); F¯ = F (y¯
g);Π¯c = Πc(p¯).
14 This is analogous to results in GL and shows that the constraint requiring the monopolist to maximize
proﬁts is not binding. This means that in searching for a Pareto optimum the planner can do no better
than use the monopoly power itself because it levies one hundred per cent proﬁt taxes and can rebate
these proﬁts to the consumers as a demogrant. Alternatively, the monopoly constraint not binding implies
that if we were to endow production of the monopoly good to the public sector (which means no price
making behavior or any behavioral constraint in the production of that good), then the public sector ﬁrm
does no better than the monopolist.
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To summarize the equations characterizing a unit-tax Pareto optimum, (3.4)-(3.10),
can be rewritten using β¯ = 0 and (3.13) as
∑
h
s¯hx¯
h
0 = −µ¯p¯T∇q0 x¯−v¯0∇q0 x¯0, (3.16)
∑
h
s¯hx¯
hT = −µ¯p¯T∇qx¯− v¯0∇qx¯0, (3.17)
∑
h
s¯h = µ¯p¯
T∇mx¯ + v¯0∇mx¯0, (3.18)
p¯T = r¯
∇yg F¯
µ¯
, (3.19)
and
p¯T∇yu0 C¯ =
v¯0
µ¯
, (3.20)
where 0 = s¯ ≥ 0, (v¯0, v¯T ) ≥ 0, and r¯ > 0.
4. Unit Tax Equilibrium as an Ad Valorem Tax Equilibrium.
First, we convert an arbitrary unit-tax equilibrium into an equivalent ad valorem tax
equilibrium. A monopoly ad-valorem tax equilibrium with 100% taxation of all proﬁts and
redistribution of governmental revenue as a demogrant, R, is given by
−x(q, q0, R) + yc(p)− ym(p, ya0)− yg ≥ 0, (4.1)
−x0(q0, q, R) + ya0 ≥ 0, (4.2)
pa0 − P a0 (τ0, p, τ, R) = 0, and (4.3)
F (yg)− g ≥ 0. (4.4)
where
q = (IN + τ )p, q0 = (1 + τ0)p
a
0, (4.5)
and
〈P a0 (p, τ0, τ, R),&Y a0 (p, τ0, τ, R)〉 :=
argmaxpa0 ,y
a
0
{pa0ya0 − C(ya0 , p)
∣∣ya0 ≥ x0(pa0(1 + τ0), pT (IN + τ ), R)}.
(4.6)
Proceeding as in (2.16), Walras’ law and the equilibrium conditions (4.1) to (4.3)
(when they hold as equalities) imply that15
Πma + Πc + τTpx + τ0p
a
0x0 − pT yg = HR, (4.7)
or
Πma + Πc + τTp[yc − ym − yg] + τ0pa0ya0 − pT yg = HR, (4.8)
15 Note that p is the vector p diagonalized to be a matrix. Similarly, τ is a diagonalized version of τ .
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where
Πma(pa0, p, y
a
0) = p
a
0y
a
0 − C(ya0 , p). (4.9)
Now, consider any unit-tax Pareto optimal equilibrium with 100% taxation of all
proﬁts and redistribution of governmental revenue as a demogrant 〈p¯u0 , t¯0, p¯, t¯, y¯g, y¯u0 , m¯〉
characterized by
−x¯ + y¯c − y¯m − y¯g ≥ 0, (4.10)
−x¯0(q¯0, q¯, m¯) + y¯u0 ≥ 0, (4.11)
p¯u0 − P u0 (p¯, t¯0, t¯, m¯) = 0, (4.12)
and
F (y¯g)− g ≥ 0. (4.13)
The consumer prices are given by q¯ = t¯ + p¯ and q¯0 = t¯0 + p¯
u
0 .
In order to represent it as an ad valorem tax equilibrium, we deﬁne τ¯ , τ¯0, p¯
a
0, y¯
a
0 , R¯ as
follows:
(i) τ¯ = t¯T p¯−1 so that q¯ = (IN + τ¯ )p¯;
(ii) R¯ = m¯;
and
(iii) y¯a0 , τ¯0, and p¯
a
0 solve
p¯a0(1 + τ¯0) = q¯0,
p¯a0 = P
a
0 (p¯, τ¯0, τ¯ , R¯),
y¯a0 = Y
a
0 (p¯, τ¯0, τ¯ , R¯).
(4.14)
From this it follows that
x(pu0 + t¯0, p¯ + t¯, m¯) = x(p¯
a
0(1 + τ¯0), p¯
T (IN + τ¯ ), R¯) (4.15)
and
x0(p¯
u
0 + t¯0, p¯ + t¯, m¯) = x0(p¯
a
0(1 + τ¯0), p¯
T (IN + τ¯ ), R¯) (4.16)
so that
y¯a0 = y¯
u
0 =: y¯0 and
∇pC(y¯0, p¯) = y¯m.
(4.17)
From the above deﬁnitions and (2.15), it follows that
Πma + Πc + τ¯T p¯[y¯c − y¯m − y¯g] + τ¯0p¯a0y¯0 − p¯T y¯g
= p¯a0y¯0 + τ¯0p¯
a
0y¯0 − C(y¯, p¯) + Πc + τ¯T p¯[y¯c − y¯m − y¯g]− p¯T y¯g
= p¯a0(1 + τ
a
0 )y¯0 − C(y¯, p¯) + Πc + t¯T [y¯c − y¯m − y¯g]− p¯T y¯g
= (p¯u0 + t¯
u
0)y¯0 − C(y¯, p¯) + Πc + t¯T [y¯c − y¯m − y¯g]− p¯T y¯g
= Πmu + Πc + t¯[y¯c − y¯m − y¯g] + t¯0y¯0 − p¯y¯g
= Hm¯ = HR¯.
(4.18)
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Thus, the above deﬁned τ¯ , τ¯0, p¯
a
0, y¯
a
0 , R¯ solve (4.1) to (4.9) and hence they deﬁne a
monopoly ad-valorem tax equilibrium with 100% taxation of all proﬁts and redistribution
of governmental revenue as a demogrant. Hence, the Pareto optimal unit tax equilibrium
described by (4.10) to (4.13), can also be interpreted as an ad valorem tax equilibrium.
Although we know that this is an ad valorem-tax equilibrium, we do not know if it
is Pareto optimal with respect to ad valorem tax changes. In order to accomplish this, we
assume that the inequalities in the ad valorem equilibrium, (4.1) to (4.6) hold with equality
and ask if there exist ad valorem Pareto-improving, equilibrium-preserving directions of
change. If there are no such changes, then every unit-tax Pareto optimum is also an ad
valorem-tax Pareto optimum.
The instruments under the control of the tax authority are given by ν = 〈dpa0,
dτ0, dp, dτ, dR, dy
g, dya0〉, and must be chosen so that ν is Pareto improving, equilibrium
preserving, ensures that wealth continues to be distributed in equal proportion, that the
monopolist is maximizing proﬁt, and that the requisite amount of the public good is being
produced.
ν is a Pareto-improving direction of change if and only if


−x¯10(1 + τ¯0) −x¯10pa0 −x¯1T (IN + τ¯ ) −x¯1T p¯ 1 0TN 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
−x¯H0 (1 + τ¯0) −x¯H0 pa0 −x¯HT (IN + τ¯ ) −x¯HT p¯ 1 0TN 0

 ν 	 0; (4.19)
ν is an equilibrium-preserving direction of change that guarantees the production of
the public good if and only if
[Ma Na ] ν ≥ 0 (4.20)
where
Ma =


−∇q0 x¯(1 + τ¯0) −∇q0 x¯pa0 −∇qx¯(IN + τ¯ ) + [∇py¯c −∇py¯m] −∇qx¯p¯
−∇q0 x¯0(1 + τ¯0) −∇q0 x¯0pa0 −∇Tq x¯0(IN + τ¯ ) −∇Tq x¯0p¯
0 0 0TN 0
T
N


(4.21)
and
Na =


−∇Rx¯ −IN −∇y0 y¯m
−∇Rx¯0 0TN 1
0 ∇TygF 0

 ; (4.22)
and ν is an ad valorem tax proﬁt-maximizing preserving directions of change if and only
if [
1 −∇τ0P¯ a0 −∇pP¯ a0 −∇τ P¯ a0 −∇RP¯ a0 0TN 0
]
ν = 0. (4.23)
If there exist Pareto-improving equilibrium-preserving directions of change that sat-
isfy the above, then ad valorem taxation Pareto dominates unit taxation. However, if
there do not exist such directions of change then every unit tax Pareto optimum is also
an ad valorem tax Pareto optimum. In fact, we show that the converse is true as well.
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Theorem A: If there is complete taxation of all proﬁts–both monopoly and the competitive
sector–and if government revenue is rebated equally by means of a demogrant, then every
unit-tax Pareto optimum is also an ad valorem-tax Pareto optimum and conversely.
Proof: Using Motzkin’s Theorem, there are no ad valorem directions of change satisfying
(4.19) to (4.23) at the unit-tax optimum if and only if there exist 0 = s˜T ≥ 0, (v˜0, v˜T ) ≥ 0,
β˜, and r˜ ≥ 0 such that
∑
h
s˜hx¯
h
0(1 + τ¯0) = −v˜T∇q0 x¯(1 + τ¯0)− v˜0∇q0 x¯0(1 + τ¯0) + β˜, (4.24)
∑
h
s˜hx¯
h
0p
a
0 = −v˜T∇q0 x¯pa0 − v˜0∇q0 x¯0pa0 − β˜∇q0P¯ a0 , (4.25)
∑
h
s˜hx¯
hT (IN + τ¯ ) = −v˜T∇qx¯(IN + τ¯ ) + v˜T [∇py¯c −∇py¯m]− v˜0∇Tq x¯0(IN + τ¯ )− β˜∇pP¯ a0 ,
(4.26)∑
h
s˜hx¯
hT p¯ = −v˜T∇qx¯p¯− v˜0∇qx¯0p¯− β˜∇τ P¯ a0 , (4.27)
∑
h
s˜h = v˜
T∇Rx¯ + v˜0∇Rx¯0 + β˜∇RP¯ a0 , (4.28)
v˜T = r˜∇Tyg F¯ , (4.29)
and
v˜T∇y0 y¯m = v˜0. (4.30)
Suppose then that (4.24)-(4.30) have a solution with 0 = s˜ ≥ 0, (v˜0, v˜) ≥ 0, β˜ and
r˜ ≥ 0. If this turns out to be correct then there are no ad valorem Pareto-improving
equilibrium-preserving directions of change. If this assumptions leads to a contradiction
then such changes exist and in that case ad valorem taxation would dominate unit taxation
in this model. We ﬁrst simplify (4.24)-(4.30) as follows.
First multiply (4.24) by p¯a0 and (4.25) by 1 + τ¯0 and then subtract (4.25) from (4.24)
to obtain
β˜(p¯a0 + (1 + τ¯0)∇τ0P¯ a0 ) = 0. (4.31)
Assuming that the monopolist cannot undo all taxes, (2.5), we have p¯a0+(1+τ¯0)∇τ0P¯ a0 = 0,
which implies that β˜ = 0.16
Next multiply (4.26) by [IN + τ¯ ]
−1 and subtract (4.27) from (4.26) after multiplying
(4.27) by p¯−1 to obtain after some manipulation
v˜T [∇py¯c −∇py¯m] = 0 (4.32)
16 The consumer price, q¯0, is locally constant, q¯0 = (1+τ¯0)P¯ a0 . Hence, dq = 0 implies p¯
a
0+(1+τ¯0)∇τ¯0 P¯ a0 =
0.
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which in turn implies, using the rank condition, that
v˜T = µ˜p¯T . (4.33)
Now substitute (4.33) into (4.29) to obtain
p¯T = r˜
∇yg F¯
µ˜
(4.34)
which shows that there is production eﬃciency in the competitive sector. Using (4.33), we
can rewrite (4.30) as
µ˜T∇y0C¯ = v˜0. (4.35)
(4.35) together with (4.34) establishes overall production eﬃciency.
Using β˜ = 0 and (4.33) we can rewrite (4.24)-(4.30) as
∑
h
s˜hx¯
h
0 = −µ˜p¯T∇q0 x¯− v˜0∇q0 x¯0, (4.36)
∑
h
s˜hx¯
hT = −µ˜p¯T∇qx¯− v˜0∇qx¯0, (4.37)
∑
h
s˜h = µ˜p¯
T∇Rx¯ + v¯0∇Rx¯0, (4.38)
p¯T = r˜
∇yg F¯
µ˜
, (4.39)
and
∇y0C¯ =
v¯0
µ˜
. (4.40)
If (4.36)-(4.40) have a solution satisfying the non-negativity and semi-positivity con-
ditions stated at the beginning of the proof, then there are no ad valorem feasible Pareto
improving directions of change and hence the unit tax Pareto optimum that we began with
is also an ad valorem Pareto optimum.
Looking at the unit-tax Pareto optimum, (3.16)-(3.20), it is obvious that setting
s˜ = s¯, v˜0 = v¯0, µ˜ = µ¯, and r˜ = r¯ solve equations (4.36)-(4.40) and hence there are no
ad valorem Pareto-improving equilibrium-preserving changes. Thus, we have shown that
every unit-tax Pareto optimum is also an ad valorem-tax Pareto optimum.
We can also show that every ad valorem-tax Pareto optimum is a unit-tax Pareto
optimum. Suppose 〈p¯a0, τ¯0, p¯, τ¯ , y¯g, y¯a0 , R¯〉 is an ad valorem Pareto optimum and it therefore
solves (4.36)-(4.40). The consumer prices are q¯ = (IN + τ¯ )p¯ and q¯0 = (1 + τ¯0)p
a
0. Deﬁne
t¯ = p¯τ¯ so that q¯ = t¯ + p¯; m¯ = R¯; and t¯0, p¯
u
0 , and y¯
u
0 such that they solve
q¯0 = p¯
u
0 + t¯0,
p¯u0 = P
u
0 (p¯, t¯, t¯0, m¯), and
y¯u0 = Y
u
0 (p¯, t¯, t¯0, m¯).
(4.41)
12
Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: GE.Monopoly.100 % Proﬁt Tax
It can be seen that 〈p¯u0 , t¯0, p¯, t¯, y¯g, y¯u0 , m¯〉 is a unit-tax equilibrium. Since we are at an ad
valorem optimum, there exist 0 = s˜T ≥ 0, (v˜0, v˜T ) ≥ 0, µ˜ > 0, and r˜ ≥ 0 which solve
(4.36) to (4.40). The multipliers s¯ = s˜, v¯0 = v˜0, µ¯ = µ˜, and r¯ = r˜ solve equations (3.16)
to (3.20). Thus, the ad valorem-tax optimum is also a unit-tax optimum.
5. Conclusion
We have shown in a general equilibrium model with monopoly that ad valorem and unit
taxation are equivalent given that the government has the power to levy one hundred per
cent proﬁt taxes and rebates its revenue, after paying for the public good inputs, to the
consumers as a demogrant. Although this probably comes as a surprise to some readers it
is easy to understand once one observes (4.18). Moving from unit to ad valorem taxation,
the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing price falls; as the consumer price and quantity are ﬁxed,
this means that the government’s indirect tax revenue from the monopolist rises. However,
the proﬁts of the monopolist fall by exactly the same amount so that government revenue
remains constant. Thus, the demogrant to each consumer remains unchanged. In short,
the particular set of policy instruments considered in the model above ensures that the
equilibrium allocations attainable under a unit-tax regime and an ad valorem-tax regime
are identical.
Although Wicksell and Suits and Musgrave stated that ad valorem taxation welfare
dominated unit taxes, they did not seriously attempt to justify this claim. Skeath and
Trandel and Keen did claim that ad valorem taxes Pareto dominated unit taxes. Their
error comes from believing that standard surplus argument could be trusted to yield actual
Pareto improvements; this is of course almost always incorrect.
Some readers may be bothered by the assumption of one hundred per cent proﬁt
taxation. However, letting there be private ownership of the monopoly presents an entirely
new set of (as yet) unresolved problems in addition to leading possibly to production
ineﬃciencies. Suppose that the government continues to distribute its revenue equally
by a demogrant but that each consumer owns a share θh of the monopoly. Now, when
the proﬁt of the monopolist changes due to the change to ad valorem taxes so does the
private income of consumer h. If θh is diﬀerent from 1/H then the consumer income
in the ad valorem-tax situation will be diﬀerent than in the unit-tax situation. Hence,
the unit-tax equilibrium cannot be reproduced as an ad valorem-tax equilibrium without
changing the distribution of wealth. This may be clearer if one thinks of the special case of
a representative consumer where all preferences satisfy the Gorman polar form and have
parallel Engel curves.17 In that case the marginal expenditure patterns of all agents are
identical. Then, switching from unit to ad valorem taxation yields the same equilibrium
prices and aggregate quantities under the two regimes. However, some individuals are
worse oﬀ and some are better oﬀ. Neither Pareto dominates the other. In the general
private ownership case, one would like to know if the utility possibility frontiers of the two
tax regimes are identical, cross one another, or dominate; as argued above, this cannot be
demonstrated by the means employed here.
17 See Gorman [1953, 1961].
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